The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Chakrabarti, A., Marjit, S., 2010. Cross-border merger, vertical structure, and spatial competition. Economics Letters 109,[112][113][114]. Speci…cally, we prove that the Nash equilibrium locations of the downstream …rms are the same in the pre-merger free-trade case as they are following a cross-border upstream merger.
Introduction
In their paper Beladi et al. (2010) attempt to extend the work of Braid (2008) to demonstrate the e¤ect of a cross-border merger between upstream …rms on the equilibrium locations of downstream …rms selling di¤erent varieties of a product. They claim that the pre-merger autarkic Nash equilibrium locations of two downstream retailers coincide with the Nash equilibrium locations of the same …rms in the post-merger free trade case. Additionally, they argue that this equilibrium is di¤erent than the corresponding Nash equilibrium in the pre-merger free trade situation. The accuracy of the above results has been compromised by both technical and conceptual ‡aws. Speci…cally, Beladi et al. (2010) fail to appropriately account for the wholesale price e¤ects. one under free trade, (ii) under free trade, the pre and post-merger Nash equilibrium locations of the downstream competitors are identical.
Model and Results
We consider a vertically related industry. To the end of facilitating the presentation we make use of the exact same notation as in Beladi et al. (2010) , with M and M the two upstream monopolists in the home and foreign country, respectively, and R (home country) and R (foreign country) the two downstream competing …rms. In the pre-merger case under autarky, the pro…t functions of R and R are respectively given by . These equations serve to correct equations (1) and (2) 1 If w w 2t > y x 2 ;both …rms are reduced to spatial-price discriminating monopolists where the common good W is now provided only by …rm R. We consider this case trivial and focus only on the case where fact that the delivered cost for good W of the …rm that is located further away, which is equal to the price charged to consumers by its rival, is equal to the sum of its transportation and marginal cost (see Braid, 2008 , p. 345): Since the marginal cost of R is equal to the wholesale price, w , the pro…ts of R realizing a sale of good W to a customer located at place z, will be equal to w + t (y z) t jz xj w = t (y z) t jz xj + w w. The corresponding pro…ts for R can be de…ned in a similar way. Having evaluated the integrals, (1) and (2) become
Solving the …rst order condition for pro…t maximization we obtain:
where r = 
Equations (4) and (5) can be derived from (1) and (2) simply by changing both w and w in (1) and (2) to thew variable used here.
After evaluating the integrals we are led to 
Pro…t maximization proves that the Nash equilibrium is
Proposition 2 Following a cross-border merger upstream, the Nash equilibrium locations of the two downstream …rms, in a vertically related industry, are 
Conclusion
We have shown that: (i) the pre-merger autarkic and post-merger free-trade equilibria in Beladi et al. (2010) are incorrect, and they need not be the same (although they will be if g = 0), and (ii) in contrast to Beladi et al. (2010) , the pre-merger and post-merger free-trade Nash equilibrium locations of the downstream …rms are identical.
